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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-1145 
 ___________ 
 
 EMMANUEL ANIM,  
 a/k/a Charlse Anim a/k/a Enoch Roberts, 
                          Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                                                                          Respondent  
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A047-376-232) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Barbara A. Nelson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 19, 2013 
 Before:  SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR. and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: July 19, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In 2011, Emmanuel Anim, a citizen of Ghana, was charged with (and conceded) 
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removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A).
1
  He sought relief via an application for 
cancellation of removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).  An Immigration Judge held, in part, that 
Anim was not entitled to relief as a matter of discretion.  See Administrative Record (A.R.) 
55–56.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Anim‟s appeal, affirming the 
decision on discretionary grounds while declining to comment upon Anim‟s statutory 
eligibility.  A.R. 37.  According to the BIA, Anim‟s “past immigration fraud” was a “serious 
adverse factor” that was not counterbalanced by his “expression of remorse and alleged 
cooperation with authorities.”  A.R. 38.  In passing, the BIA disputed Anim‟s assertion 
(expressed in his appellate brief before the agency) that his naturalization fraud was 
“victimless.”  A.R. 38 (referencing A.R. 73). 
 Anim did not petition for review, filing instead a timely motion to reopen.
2
  See 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).  In it, he disavowed his prior description of his offense as “victimless.”  
A.R. 21.  Anim attached three pertinent exhibits: an affidavit that, inter alia, blamed the 
“victimless” aside on prior counsel; a letter from his son to the District Judge in his criminal 
case; and a letter from his pastor.  A.R. 26–34.   
The BIA denied the motion, in part because Anim “ha[d] not shown that the evidence he 
wishes to present, including letters of support from his son and pastor . . . was unavailable at 
the removal hearing.”  Otherwise, “[t]o the extent that [the] affidavit could be considered new 
and previously unavailable evidence, it [wa]s insufficient to warrant reopening of these 
                                                   
1
 The removal proceedings followed Anim‟s conviction in federal court for naturalization fraud.  See 
S.D.N.Y. Crim. No. 1:11-cr-00042. 
  
2
 Because he did not file a timely petition for review of the BIA‟s merits decision, it is not before us.  
Castro v. Att‟y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir. 2012).  
3 
 
proceedings.”  A.R. 4.  Furthermore, the BIA indicated that it had “already considered 
[Anim‟s] expressions of remorse,” but had found him “undeserving of discretionary relief, 
after taking into account all relevant factors.”  A.R. 4.  Anim‟s request for reopening sua 
sponte also was denied.  This petition for review followed.  
 “[B]efore we reach the merits of this appeal, we first must consider our jurisdiction.”  
United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1054 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Kreider v. Cole, 149 F. 
647, 649 (3d Cir. 1907).  The discretionary denial of cancellation of removal is not subject to 
judicial review.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Reynoso v. Holder, 711 F.3d 199, 210 (1st 
Cir. 2013); Patel v. Att‟y Gen., 619 F.3d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2010).  Restrictions on appellate 
jurisdiction generally apply with equal force to the review of motions to reopen arising out of 
discretionary decisions.  See Sorcia v. Holder, 643 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 2011); Fernandez v. 
Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 601 (9th Cir. 2006).  However, we retain jurisdiction to review 
“colorable” constitutional claims or questions of law.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Pareja v. 
Att‟y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186–87 (3d Cir. 2010).  Thus, we may review a denial of a motion to 
reopen if the agency‟s action was contrary to law or rose to the level of a denial of due process, 
and did not otherwise rely on a discretionary rationale.  See, e.g., Alzainati v. Holder, 568 F.3d 
844, 850 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[I]f, in deciding a motion to reopen, the BIA refuses, contrary to 
established procedures, to consider new and pertinent evidence, due process rights are 
implicated.”). 
 Anim argues that the BIA erred by characterizing his affidavit as evidence that was 
previously available (he does not allege that the agency‟s rejection of the two letters was also 
error).  However, as discussed supra, the BIA explicitly held that it would have reached the 
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same discretionary decision even if the affidavit were “new.”  Thus, to the extent that this 
claim could be characterized as a legal argument, it cannot lead to relief, is not colorable, and 
does not bring the BIA‟s decision within our jurisdiction.  Cf. Bachynskyy v. Holder, 668 F.3d 
412, 420 (7th Cir. 2011).  
Anim also maintains that the BIA erred by failing to exercise its sua sponte authority to 
reopen.  “Because the BIA retains unfettered discretion to decline to sua sponte reopen or 
reconsider a deportation proceeding, this court is without jurisdiction to review a decision 
declining to exercise such discretion to reopen or reconsider the case.”  Desai v. Att‟y Gen., 
695 F.3d 267, 269 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Under two 
narrow exceptions to this rule, a decision to deny sua sponte relief can be reviewed if it is 
based on an incorrect legal premise, see id., or if the BIA has “restricted the exercise of its 
discretion by establishing a „general policy‟ of reopening sua sponte” under specific 
circumstances, Cruz v. Att‟y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2006).  Neither exception 
applies here. 
For the foregoing reasons, we lack jurisdiction over this petition for review.  
Accordingly, we will dismiss it. 
 
 
